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Abstract:  The paper reviews the role of small farms in development and poverty reduction in 
countries (or regions within a country) with persistent mass poverty. It discusses the 
arguments supporting the importance of agricultural development for poverty and argues that 
initial success in reduction of mass poverty requires prior agricultural developments. It 
explores in particular the role of smallscale farming and policy requirements to ensure the 
competitive advantage of small farms. 
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I.  Introduction  
 
This paper is confined to the role of small farms in development and poverty reduction in 
countries (or large regions within a country) with persistent mass dollar poverty – where, say, 
one-third  or  more  of  the  population  are  below  the  PPP  dollar-a-day  poverty  line.  The 
conventional wisdom, set out with evidence in IFAD’s 2001 Rural Poverty Report, is that in 
such places development with substantial, sustainable mass poverty reduction is achievable, 
but initially - save in very rare cases - only via rapidly accelerated productivity and income 
growth on small farms. 
 
There are three reasons why this might be disputed.  
(I) Non-farm growth might be seen as a more credible option; one might question whether - 
given past progress, environmental limits, world price trends, falling share of farm workforce, 
and so forth - agricultural growth, on small farms or large, is feasible in remaining mass-
poverty areas, let alone promising against poverty.   
(II) Alternatively, one might accept that accelerated agricultural growth is both feasible and a 
precondition for initial mass poverty reduction, but believe that processes of national poverty 
reduction are consistent with large-scale farming.  
(III) One might claim that small farms in (some) developing countries (a) never were more 
equitable and efficient than large farms as a source of initial mass poverty reduction and 
development, (b) whether or not they were, are not now, because world-wide processes of 
farm change - commercialisation of increasing proportions of input and output; institutional 
developments such as supermarkets; privatisation of key aspects of technical progress, and of 
output and process grades and standards – now indicate a large-farm focus. 
 
This paper concentrates on issue (II), but first briefly reviews the valid range of assumptions 
on issues (I) and (II) above, which are logically prior issues. Has ‘agricultural progress’ in 
developing countries still a big part to play in reducing initial, persistent mass poverty? If so, 
do the processes, by which agricultural progress can cut poverty, mandate small-farm focus, 
exclude it, or neither? Only after agreeing working assumptions on (I) and (II) can we proceed 
to our core question (III): what do theory, history and recent experience tell us about whether   e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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small  farms  (to  be  defined)  can,  will,  or  should  remain  central  to  initial  mass  poverty 
reduction?
1  
 
II. Is Farming a Route to Cutting Initial Mass Dollar Poverty?  
 
Until fairly recently, most developing countries acted as if the role of agriculture in mass 
poverty  reduction  was  quite  small.  Terms  of  trade  were  heavily  turned  against  farming 
through selective industrial protection, subsidised food imports, compulsory procurement of 
farm  products, and  exchange-rate overvaluation. Public  expenditure per person on  health, 
education,  and  physical  infrastructure  was  far  higher  in  rural  than  in  urban  areas. 
Development  was  seen  as  requiring  rapid  industrialisation,  even  without  and  before 
significant agricultural or rural progress. 
 
Two things have changed this perception. First, it became clear that price and expenditure 
policies  to  bias  development  towards  industry-led  growth  delivered  neither  growth  nor 
poverty reduction. Terms-of-trade and public-expenditure bias in favour of urban industry, 
while cutting farm growth and harming the rural poor, generated little industrial growth (at 
border prices) and very little extra employment per unit of output. Second, technical progress 
- irrigation, fertilisers, and new crop varieties (hybrid maize Latin America from the mid-
1950s, semi-dwarf wheat and rice in much of Asia from the mid-1960s) - showed that, under 
the right conditions, agricultural growth could bring hundreds of millions of people rapidly 
and sustainably out of dollar poverty. This worked despite artificial measures to damage both 
price incentives and stability
2 for farmers in developing countries, both via developed-country 
farm subsidies and tariffs, and via developing-country policies biased, sometimes heavily, 
against the rural sector.  
 
                                                 
1This paper draws, with regard to issues (I) and (II), on M. Lipton, ‘The family farm in a globalising world: the role of crop science in 
alleviating poverty’, International Food Policy research Institute, Washington, D.C., 2005; and, with regard to issue (II), on R. Eastwood, A. 
Newell and M. Lipton, ‘Farm size’, in vol. IV, Handbook of Agricultural Economics, ed. R. Evenson, P. Pingali and P. Schultz, Rotterdam: 
Elsevier, forthcoming.  On all three issues, and related matters, see International Fund for Agricultural Development, Rural Poverty Report 
2001, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
2EU long used a ‘reference price’ system so EU farmers, when world prices fell, were compensated by higher support per unit of output, 
and so did not cut output. Hence they fell further, destabilising returns for non-EU farmers. See U. Koester, Policy Options for the Grain 
Economy of the European Community: Implications for Developing Countries.(Research Report No. 35), Washington, D.C. :  International 
Food Policy Research Institute, 1982.     e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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Governments, analysts and the public in some developing countries now appear to accept, in 
principle, that mass poverty has initially to be, and can be, reduced by growth in agriculture. 
Globally, Ravallion has shown that over 70 per cent of the dollar-poor are rural and, on best 
projections of migration and growth, that the proportion will be over half until 2035. In the 
large majority of mass-poverty countries (and sub-regions): 
More than two-thirds of the workforce has its main single income source in agriculture. 
In rural areas, though recent research shows that the rural poor derive significant, growing 
parts of income from non-farm work,
3 agriculture is by far the main income source. 
The  few  available  studies  show  that  8-15  per  cent  of  workers  classified  as  urban  have 
agriculture as the main income source; the proportion of the urban poor is higher.  
 
Farming is what the great mass of the poor do. That, however, does not imply that poverty 
reduction should take an agriculture-first path (to raise poor people‘s income from what they 
mostly do) - any more that it implies an anti-agricultural path (to get the poor into activities 
where poverty is less). But it demands that we confront and specify the choices between those 
two routes.  
 
The  poor’s  income  depends  mainly  on  labour.  To  bid  up  demand  for  labour  (and  hence 
employment and/or the wage-rate) in capital-constrained economies, capital should go where 
capital costs per extra workplace - in self-employment or hired work - are relatively low, as in 
most agriculture. Though the response of employment to output growth has been falling in 
some  poor  areas  (within  India  and  China),  it  remains  substantially  larger  than  in  other 
sectors.
4  
 
Except perhaps for owner-occupied housing, farmland is the dollar-poor’s main major asset 
type (non-labour source of productive income) as well as the asset type of which they have the 
largest share. For reasons of arithmetic as well as of work experience, it is therefore credible 
                                                 
3The same research, however, shows that rural non-farm growth and employment-intensity depend largely on expanded demand from prior, 
nearby agricultural growth. Further, while most poor farmers derive significant income shares from non-farming, it is often forgotten that 
the converse also applies. 
4Recent time-series from India have created an illusion: that the elasticity of employment to output in agriculture has become very low or 
negative.  Labour-displacing  innovation  (mainly  tractors  and  weedicides)  indeed  cut  the  employment-intensity  of  farm  output,  during 
agricultural growth. However, the innovation produced almost no growth, but replaced labour on given land. With similar spread of tractors 
and weedicides but slower agricultural growth, employment losses would have been substantially more.     e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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that more poverty reduction is likely to be achieved by achieve raising returns to farmland 
than to other assets - provided ownership of land is not more biased against the poor than of 
other assets.
5  
 
The dollar-poor typically spend over two-thirds of income on food and over half of income on 
staples. Large, though not well documented, proportions of the dollar-poor depend for these 
mainly on own or nearby farms. As long as internal or international transport costs for food 
(especially  staples)  loom  large  relative  to  value,  local  farming  therefore  restrains  and 
stabilises  the  price  of  the  poor’s  main  consumables  -  which  loom  much  smaller  in  the 
spending of the rich. 
 
In assessing the case for or against small farms, we should ask whether the above three links 
from agricultural growth to poverty reduction – via labour demand, asset ownership, and food 
and staples prices – operate better through small or large farms, and (which is an overlapping 
issue, but not quite the same one) through more or less equal distribution of farmland.
6 These 
static links from agricultural development to mass poverty reduction are over and above the 
intersectoral connections spelled out in classic work by Mellor, Johnston, Kilby
7 and others. 
Theoretical links apart, recent empirical evidence that farm growth is more pro-poor than non-
farm  growth  in  mass-poverty  heartlands  is  strong  (fn  5).  Historically,  too,  agricultural 
acceleration preceded non-farm growth, and accompanied initial mass poverty reduction, in 
developing Europe, America and Japan in the 18
th and 19
th centuries. This has also been true 
of  late  twentieth-century  success  stories,  except  a  few  unusually  well-managed  mineral 
economies and entrepot city-states.
8 
 
                                                 
5Latin America, where land Ginis are exceptionally high, does not clearly follow the pattern of Asia and Africa that farm growth is more 
pro-poor than is other growth - a pattern shown econometrically in international cross-sections, and in regional cross-sections and time 
series for China, India, Indonesia, etc. See review in R. Eastwood and M. Lipton, ‘Pro-poor growth and pro-growth poverty reduction: 
meaning, evidence, policy implications’, Asian Development Review 18 (2000): 22-58. 
6Growth in poor countries may be slowed by very unequal income and (more clearly) assets (Eastwood and Lipton 2000).  
7 Johnston, Bruce F., and John W. Mellor, ‘The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development’ American Economic Review  51 (1961): 
566-93; Johnston, B. F. and P. Kilby,  Agriculture and Structural Transformation: economic strategies in late-developing countries, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1975, 
8Some countries once seen as exceptions have turned out not to be. For example, post-1945 Korea’s manufacturing growth was not prior, 
but based on agricultural acceleration in the 1930s and 1940s.   e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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Theory, history, and empirics cannot disprove that some part of Africa, or ‘inner’ South or 
East Asia, should attack mass poverty while bypassing agriculture (environmental constraints, 
or industrial opportunities, might require that). But they are not a good trio of enemies to 
choose. 
  
Ironically, it is in the countries that have accepted the priority of agriculture for initial mass 
poverty reduction, and where governments have acted accordingly to achieve such reduction - 
China, India, much of the rest of Asia, some of Latin America - that later mass poverty 
reduction has come to depend increasingly on non-farm growth. Yet even in most of these 
successful countries there are regions with still high dollar poverty (i.e. low local income 
growth,  insufficiently  offset  by  high  inward  remittances).  These  poor  regions  within 
successfully  developing  countries  -  like  the  unsuccessful  developing  an  poverty-reducing 
countries  within  a  developing  and  poverty-reducing  world  -  usually  show  weaker  past 
agricultural performance and more present dependence on agriculture. Moreover, they feature 
faster population growth than surrounding regions or countries, so the concentration of the 
poor in these less successful areas is increasing.
9 
 
Unfortunately,  while  many  poor  countries  have  shifted  their  price  policies  away  from 
agricultural and rural extraction, their public-expenditure policies have, if anything, shifted in 
the reverse direction, partly under fiscal stress, partly because the internal balance of rural-
urban  power  requires  compensation  for  the  price-policy  shifts.  On  most  measures,  for 
developing countries overall, the substantial rural-urban inequalities (in mean real income, 
poverty incidence, and health and education) show no downtrend since the 1970s.
10  This may 
be related to the fact that, while urban bias in developing countries, at least via farm price 
repression,  has  been forced  down  by  economic  realities,  developed-country  policies  have 
increasingly discriminated against developing-country farm production.
11 This is shown both 
                                                 
9T. Dyson, R. Cassen & L. Visaria, Twenty-first Century India, Oxford: oxford Unversity Press, 2004. 
10R. Eastwood and M. Lipton, ‘Rural-urban dimensions of inequality change’, in Inequality, Growth and Poverty in an Era of Liberalization 
and  Globalisation, ed. G. Cornia (UNU-WIDER: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
11OECD farm subsidies rose from $182 billion in 1995 (40% of production) to $248 billion in 1999-2001 (de Moor, A.P.G.  ‘Perverse 
Incentives - Subsidies and Sustainable Development: key issues and reform strategies’, Earth Council, 1996; R. Ricupero, Report of address 
to UN (ECOSOC), 30/6/2003. Third  World Network http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twe309a.htm These subsidies are claimed to help 
smaller OECD farms (which are relatively labour-intensive) to survive, so more people can stay in farmwork: the peasant outcome.  Yet 
OECD farm support has not overcome the tendency of farm size to grow in rich countries, and of farm employment to decline – indeed, it 
may  have  worsened prospects  for  the  peasant  outcome.  Between  1986-90 and  1996-7,  farm  employment  fell  from  7.1% per cent  of   e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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by the explosion of farm support in OECD countries, and by the collapse of international aid 
to agriculture, both in absolute terms (a fall of almost two-thirds since the mid-1980s) and as 
a share of sectorally allocable aid. In 1990-2015, the period in which developed countries 
purportedly prioritise halving world dollar poverty as the first MDG, they have so far slashed 
aid to agricultural development - and intensified farm support policies that discourage it by 
false incentives to glut world markets. These incentives misdirect not only developed-world 
farmers,  but  also  scientists  everywhere,  who  are  increasingly  stimulated  to  distort  farm 
science to focus on increasing subsidised, capital-intensive competition against farms in the 
developing world, which is then lectured about free markets. 
 
There  are  some  signs  of  improvement  in  developed  countries.  Many  committees  and 
ministries promise modest reversal of the collapse of aid to developing-country farming, and 
modest reduction of trade discrimination against it (though we have heard such promises 
before). Whether this happens or not, more and more analysts and politicians in developing 
countries with mass poverty - say 30% or more of their people below a dollar a day - accept 
that faster growth of agricultural income, output and productivity are extremely helpful, and 
usually necessary, to start a sustainable process of mass poverty reduction. 
 
III.  Do Small Farms Fit Processes of Initial Mass Poverty Reduction?  
Suppose we agree with that. Suppose, also, that we believe, for most countries and regions, 
that substantial sustainable farm growth acceleration is feasible.
12 Do the likely processes of 
achieving this indicate a focus on small-scale or large-scale farming? Further, do world-wide 
processes of farm change - commercialisation of increasing proportions of input and output; 
institutional developments such as supermarkets; privatisation of key aspects of technical 
progress, and of output and process grades and standards – increasingly indicate large-farm 
focus? I suggest: 
(1) Neither poverty-reducing nor farm-globalising processes either mandate or exclude small 
farms as the basis of agriculture-led, rapidly poverty-reducing development.  
                                                                                                                                                          
workforce to 4.9% - numbers fell by 14% - in the EU-15 despite huge farm support, but fell much more slowly in Australia and New 
Zealand, with much less support per unit of output [ILOSTAT]. 
12For  sub-Saharan  Africa,  and  for  water-scarce  regions,  there  is  a  contrary  view.  The  issues  are  too  complex  to  discuss  here;  see 
International Fund for Agricultural Development, Rural Poverty Report 2001, loc.cit.,  ch. 4.    e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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(2) However, credible processes of initial, rapid mass poverty reduction require rapid growth 
in demand for productive labour, and in its command over staples. Both requirements indicate 
a small-farm orientation, especially in very poor or remote countries or sub-regions.  
Processes  of  farm  commercialisation  and  globalisation  make  the  small-farm  route  more 
difficult if there are substantial intermediation failures between small farms and the emerging 
customers and institutions of globalising farm change.  
 
Issue (3) is dealt with in sec. III. How might it be reconciled with (2) in the context of an 
agriculture-led  development  policy?  One  might  identify  (a)  efficient,  affordable  shifts  in 
incentives or institutions so as to favour employment-intensity in a large-farm growth path;
13 
or (b) efficient, affordable support for, or market development of, successful intermediation 
between small and family farms and growing, modernising export or supermarket outlets (see 
below), or (c) paths by which small farms can efficiently grow without such access – not 
absurd; I hypothesise that most rural poor, and the world’s ‘smaller half’ of farms, are in 
substantial food deficit, and can expand a good deal while achieving staples self-sufficiency.
14 
Much progress has been made on (a), but it requires a higher priority; almost no progress on 
(b); and modest progress is beginning on (c) with spreading awareness that mass-poverty-
reducing agricultural growth usually starts with staples for national, even local or domestic, 
use,  not  with  export  horticulture,  and  that,  without  decrying  the  medium-term  need  for 
smallholders to switch towards marketed crops in the medium term,  ‘staples security first’ 
may  well be the right  sequence for smallholders in  much of  inner Asia and sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 
Why  do credible  processes  of poverty  reduction strongly indicate small-farm growth  ((2) 
above)? The three arguments for agriculture as the main, normally the only, feasible source of 
processes of early, rapid mass early poverty reduction (pp. 2-3) re-emerge as arguments that 
                                                 
13If advocates of such a path showed that it might, with stated policies, affordably create demand for the growing and under-employed poor 
workforce,  it would be easier to take large-farm recipes for initial mass poverty reduction seriously. (Much the same can be said of 
proposed non-farm-led escape routes). Unemployment data in Africa are notoriously fraught, but (for example) ILO and other enquiries 
confirm genuine time-rates of adult unemployment over 30% in South Africa – more in rural areas.   
14The common claim that poor deficit farmers who do not market have no cash to buy inputs, and therefore cannot much raise output, is 
incorrect. By definition such farm households buy staples. If they grow more, they can divert cash (from nonfarm activity, hired work on 
others’ farms, etc.) from staples purchases to staples-input purchases and will have cash in hand. There may, of course, be a first-year credit 
problem    e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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such processes should have a small-farm focus. In that form, the ‘small-farm logic’ appears 
sound. The ‘stylised facts’ behind it are not very controversial. Yet evidence for or against 
them is surprisingly scarce. So it remains possible that, under conditions to be empirically 
established,  large-farm  agriculture  might  be  a  major  source  of  mass  poverty  reduction. 
Because the ‘small-farm logic’ is rather strong, I hypothesise that such circumstances are rare, 
and cover only small proportions of persons in areas of mass initial dollar poverty; but the 
issue needs to be more fully explored. 
 
The demand-for-labour argument: That the poor’s income depends largely on labour, and that 
agriculture has lowest costs per workplace and highest average and marginal capital/labour 
ratios  in  early  development  in  poor  regions,  is  a  central  argument  behind  the  case  for 
agricultural growth as the key to development that slashes initial mass poverty by bidding up 
the returns to (employment and/or wage-rate of) poor workers. This process applies more 
convincingly if such development is through small farms.  
 
For example, in Pakistan in 1972 farms above 60.7 ha engaged 0.12 workers per hectare and 
farms  of  20.2-60.7  ha  0.22  workers/ha  –  whereas  farms  below  0.4  ha  engaged  9.15 
workers/ha,  and  farms  of  0.4-1.0  ha  3.32  workers/ha;
15  data  for  Bangladesh,  Thailand, 
Indonesia  and  India  were  comparable.  Simulations  showed  that  egalitarian  redistribution 
would raise labour demand and use: by only 9 per cent in Java, but by 19-24 per cent in 
Bangladesh, Pakistan,  Thailand and the Outer Islands of Indonesia.
16  Plausible partial land 
redistribution on Brazil’s estate sub-sector would raise person-year equivalents of labour use 
in agriculture from 2.6 to 3.0 million over the 1978 base case; and World Bank evidence from 
the 1970s showed ‘employment per hectare higher .. in those countries that have .. more equal 
distribution of land ownership’.
17  
 
Most of these data are rather out-of-date. More recent data are scanty partly because higher 
labour-intensity on small farms, other things roughly equal, is not seriously contested, resting 
not only on widespread observation - some by sceptics who see small farms as sources of 
                                                 
15For other size-groups, workers-per-hectare: 1-2ha, 1.72; 2-3ha, 1.12; 3-5.1ha, 0.82; 5.1-10.1ha, 0.52; and 10.1-20.2ha, 0.32 w/ha (A.  
Booth and R. Sundrum, Labour Absorption in Agriculture, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1984: 101].  
16Ibid.: 100-9, 279-80. 
17G. Kutcher and P. Scandizzo, The Agricultural Economy of Northeast Brazil, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1981: 201; 37.    e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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‘self-ex-ploitation’  - but also on  basic transaction-cost  theory (sec.  III below).  It  is often 
objected that many small farms owe part of their higher labour/land ratios to their better land 
or water resources, but this is itself in part a consequence of earlier choices of higher ratios, 
used to improve or maintain land/water resources (terracing, bunding, manuring, etc.) - often 
off-season, when family labour can be used to build up ‘labouresque’ capital more readily on 
small farms than on large.
18 
 
The demand-for-labour argument for small-farm emphasis in poverty reduction should not 
rest only, or in some regions mainly, on small farms’ greater capacity to generate income-per-
hectare for self-employed family farmers. For instance, in India, hired labour is the main 
income source of more rural households, and many more poor rural households, than is than 
own-account farming.
19 But, world-wide, most evidence is that smaller farm size goes with 
higher demand for hired labour per hectare, despite a lower ratio of hired to family labour. 
Further, better growth options on (or land transfer to) smaller farms provide incentives for 
farm families to withdraw labour supply, from hiring-out, into the family farm; this raises the 
proportion  of  work  in  the  hired-labour  market  available  to  the  landless,  and  thus  their 
employment and/or wage-rate.  
 
The reliance of the poor on rising demand for labour for poverty reduction – and also for 
bargaining power and dignity – is at the core of the case for agriculture as the leading source 
of initial mass poverty reduction. Setting agricultural growth mainly into a context of small, 
labour-intensive farms greatly strengthens that argument, and has been shown by abundant 
worldwide experience to be feasible. That does not imply, however, that large farms are not 
suitable for some purposes, even where capital/labour ratios are low, nor that large farms 
cannot be stimulated to be more employment-intensive and pro-poor. However, opponents of 
small-farm approaches have so far done little to show where, or how, this has been, or can be, 
achieved. 
 
It  is  often  mistakenly  believed  that  slower  population  growth  weakens  the  employment-
related case for small-farm-centred poverty reduction processes. On the contrary: workforce 
                                                 
18A.K. Sen, Choice of Techniques (3
rd ed.). Cambridge University Press, 1968.  
19K. Sundaram and S. Tendulkar, The Working Poor in India: Employment-Policy Linkages and Employment Policy Options, International 
Labour Office, Recovery and Reconstruction Dept (Geneva), 2002: 43.   e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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grows  rapidly  well  after  child  population  growth  ahs  slowed  or  stopped,  creating  a 
‘demographic  window’  to  work  one’s  way  out  of  poverty  –  but  only  if  labour  demand 
expands, affordably, at least as fast as workforce, as happened in East Asia in 1960-90 thanks 
mainly to small-farm-based growth. The effect of new farm technologies in reducing poverty 
incidence  in  1965-2000  was  much  amplified  by  the  falling  dependency  ratio.  Lower 
proportions of dependents were supported by fast-rising numbers of workers, for many of 
whom the new farm technology provided rising employment income. The fertility reductions 
triggering this process
20 came somewhat later to South Asia and Africa, but are now sharply 
cutting dependency ratios for poor countries in these regions too. In 2000, there were 99 
dependants for every 100 people of prime working age in Ethiopia; the projection for 2030 is 
72. For Nigeria the dependency ratio falls from 99 to 67; for Bangladesh from 79 to 55; and 
for India from 71 to 58.
21 If physical conditions allow, and policies stimulate, small-farm-led 
poverty reduction in Africa and ‘inner Asia’, demographics makes 2000-2030 an ideal time 
for it. If those chances are not provided by crop science and appropriate policy, the extra 
workers will face downward pressure on rural wage-rates or employment, and the opportunity 
will be lost after 2030-50,
22 as rises in the proportion of over-60s put the dependency ratio 
into reverse (i.e. it starts to rise again).  
 
Three challenges to the above ‘employment-intensity’ case for small-scale farming should be 
noted. First, some regions with high year-round average unemployment (and low wage-rates) 
nevertheless  face  extreme  seasonal  labour  peaks,  when  wage-rates  rise  sharply  and/or 
absolute  labour  scarcity  (in  some  sense!)  persists  at  low  wage-rates.  While  research, 
extension, and water policy should certainly respond to such conditions, they do not justify 
(say)  shifting  agriculture,  or  its  growth,  towards  larger  and  less  labour-intensive  farms. 
Second, large rural regions are afflicted by HIV/AIDS, reducing effective  labour availability. 
However, it cannot ameliorate this temporary though tragic demographic situation by policies 
to reduce demand for, and hence wage-rates of, labour, for example by shifting agricultural 
growth away from small employment-intensive units. Third, artificial stimulation  of farm 
output in OECD countries has induced technical change, and basic science, favourable to 
                                                 
20Strictly, the process starts with big infant mortality falls during 1945-60 as malaria is controlled and nutrition improved. This first raises 
dependency ratios, but as the ‘saved’ infants age into the workforce, the process slows down and then reverses. Later, fertility decline 
strengthens the reversal (fall in dependency ratios).   
21These data allow for HIV/AIDS. It hits mainly (i) persons aged 15-30, (ii) infants, with offsetting effects on dependency ratios.  
22The dates of the turning point vary by country, as did the earlier changes (fn. 35) that set the process going.    e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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farms of ‘OECD’ size and factor endowments, and thus to labour replacement in farms of all 
sizes, even in poor countries with plenty of labour per unit of capital and land. This, however, 
is anyway reflected in factor markets, and hence farm sizes, in developing countries. We shall 
see that these have nevertheless featured steady increases in the proportion of land in small 
farms. It is unappealing to suggest that developing countries should respond to rising world 
capital/labour ratios – given that lower ones will anyway be chosen by small farms than by 
large ones - with policies that increase market incentives to shift land towards large farms. 
 
The assets argument: In China and Vietnam, and to a somewhat lesser extent in most of the 
rest of Asia and of central and western Africa, a large majority of the rural poor have, at least, 
usufruct rights to enough farmland to provide a significant proportion of household income. 
The absolute value of these rights has been reduced over time by declining farm size, but 
except in Africa this has been more than offset at national level, and in most regions, by 
offsetting rises in productivity of farmland.
23 Even where severe land inequality prevails, as in 
Southern and parts of East Africa and most of Latin America, many or most of the rural poor 
derive significant parts of income from owned, communal, or rented farmland. 
 
In most areas where widespread poverty prevails, therefore, anti-poverty paths via enhancing 
the physical assets of the poor, as well as via employment income and via food entitlements, 
direct policy towards increasing the resources and technology base – and the land base – of 
small  farms  rather  than  large  ones.  Policies  to  enhance  the  poor’s  farm  machinery  or 
largestock run against the fact that in most countries the dollar-poor own a smaller proportion 
of such assets than of farmland, for good reasons (divisibility, collateral, risk). Smallstock 
assets are often distributed at least as equally as land, and pro-poor policy here has therefore 
some leverage, but the absolute value of the poor’s smallstock is much less than that of their 
farmland. The poor do normally have some housing assets, but these are seldom (perhaps too 
seldom) seen as a part of pro-poor production policy. 
 
The staples argument: Food staples comprise a substantially higher proportion, by value, of 
output growth on small farms than on large ones. So farm growth is likelier to restrain and 
stabilise the price of staples if it is concentrated on small farms. The dollar-poor spend a 
                                                 
23Falling world staples prices since 1980 reduce the value of this offset, but were themselves partly offset by falling domestic policy bias 
against staples prices. Remaining net price falls are less harmful for food deficit farmers, including most small farms.    e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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considerably higher average income share (typically well over half) on food staples than the 
non-poor. The poor therefore acquire a higher proportion of consumer gains, from a given 
absolute value of extra farm output, if it is concentrated in smaller farms. Also the poor have a 
higher marginal propensity to consume staples; therefore, as the poor’s money income rises, 
their gains are increased to the extent that extra food production comes from small farms with 
higher staples focus. Freeing of global food markets (and large public foodgrain reserves, e.g. 
in India) may moderate the impact of domestic staples output growth – and hence of the 
small-farm share of such growth - on prices facing the poor, but only to a modest extent, due 
to the high ratio of staples transport costs to production costs. 
 
The facts behind this logic, while perhaps not very controversial, are hard to verify.  
(a) I can find no database, at FAOSTAT, the World Bank or elsewhere, collating estimates 
(let alone those from reliable nationwide, and/or successive, household surveys) of average or 
marginal staples/consumption (or even food/consumption, or food/income) ratios by income 
group.
24  
(b) There is limited evidence that staples/production ratios rise as farm size falls. It is familiar 
that labour-intensity of crop-mix rises, but that does not help much, because labour-intensity 
in staples is intermediate between that in other main land uses: more than in pasture/grazing, 
trees,  and  most  fruit  crops;  less  than  in  beverage  crops,  cotton,  rubber,  sugar  and  most 
vegetables. However, bitty data, and ‘anecdotal wisdom’, that smaller or poorer farmers are 
likelier to devote given land  to staples is supported  both  by food security considerations 
(absolute aversion from hunger risk increases with the level of that risk) and by the fact that, 
in  raising  staples  output,  surplus  farmers  increase,  but  net  food-  buying  farmers  reduce, 
marketing transaction costs.
25  
(c) That the rural (urban) poor are likelier than the rural (urban) non-poor – and rural and 
remote people (with higher poverty incidence), than urban people – to source staples from 
own production or locally, and to face high unit cost of staples transport and distribution from 
central stores or ports, seems self-evident, but the evidence again is thin. It is important to 
pinpoint  exceptions  to  any  general  rule  that  the  poor  are  so  placed,  and  therefore  less 
                                                 
24Grouping by income-per-household is useless. Income per consumer unit or adult equivalent is preferable to income per person.  
25Price risk, too, rises with rising output of a main locally-consumed staple for surplus farmers (deterring its production) but falls for deficit 
farmers (encouraging them to grow more of the staple): C. Barrett, ' On price risk and the inverse farm size-productivity relationship' , J. 
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‘delinked’ than others, by easy access to local or global staples markets, from any effects of 
farm size on the price or reliability of their consumption due to local supply. 
 
Crude absorption: A related point is that countries with initial, largely rural, mass poverty 
present  a  further  crude  demand-side  case  for  concentrating  agricultural  growth  on  small 
farms. Such growth evades the demand/marketing problem to some extent, because much of 
small farms’ extra output comprises staples consumed locally – often in the farm household, 
or by (extra) farm labour. The marginal propensity to consume farm products is high for small 
farmers and farmworkers, but low for large farmers and owners of substantial land or farm 
capital. Hence, for example, in India there is much potential for poverty-reducing growth 
through expanded, labour-intensive staples production on small deficit farms in the poorer 
States;  but  little,  if anything,  is  gained  when  well-off  surplus  farmers  in  the  Punjab  (are 
subsidised  to) grow extra wheat and  rice capital-intensively. Absent much direct  demand 
created  by  the  incomes  corresponding  to  the  extra  output  -  well-off  farmers  and  tractor-
owners do not use much of their extra income to buy food -  it is then sold to the Food 
Corporation of India for long-term storage (and deterioration); India’s poor have little extra 
income with which to buy such grain, and export markets are protected and/or, for large 
sellers, price-inelastic.    
     
Agricultural  priority  and  consistency  of  reducing  poverty  in  all  main  poor  groups:  One 
criterion for good pro-poor policy is that it should not set large groups of the poor against one 
another by achieving poverty reduction at the cost of creating many losers who are ‘stuck’ in 
a particular group. The conditions for growing agricultural income, output and productivity to 
benefit  all  main  poverty  groups  –  those  whose  income  derives  mainly  from  small-scale 
farming, from rural labour or non-farm activity, and from urban work – are in fact rather tight. 
(We  were  fortunate  that  the  green  revolution  largely  met  these  conditions.)  In  particular 
agricultural growth - e.g. via new science, or applications of existing science - has to walk 
two tightropes, and this is much easier if the growth is concentrated on small farms. 
 
The  price/total-productivity  tightrope:  to  help  poor  food  consumers  and  poor  farmers  as 
marketers  respectively,  farm  growth  must  cut  staples  prices,  but  must  raise  total  factor 
productivity on small farms faster. If farm growth is concentrated on small farms, much of it 
comprises  extra  staples  grown  by  poor  households  with  a  high  marginal  propensity  to   e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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consume them. Prices are still pressed downwards (the marginal propensity is less than one), 
but by less than if fare growth is on big farms in staples surplus, where farmers’ extra self-
consumption out of income is small and anyway can form only a small part of extra output. 
 
The wagerate-labour/land-productivity tightrope: In early development out of mass poverty - 
in  the  increasingly  universal  condition  that  unused  farmland  is  absent  or  very  costly  to 
develop  -  for  farm  growth  to  help  poor  farmers  as  employers  and  poor  farm  labourers
26 
respectively,  it  must  raise  output  per  labour-hour,  but  output  per  hectare  more.  Such 
concentration on employment-intensive extra production – especially product-mixes but also 
product-specific technical choice – is much likelier on small farms, for familiar transactions-
cost reasons (sec. III). 
 
The case for small farms self-destructs, but only with success: It is, then, the very arguments 
for agricultural growth as the main channel of initial mass poverty reduction, that point to 
small, not large, farms as the main carriers of such growth. Agriculture within mass-poverty 
economies  -  and,  for  the  same  reasons,  small  farming  within  agriculture  -  is  the  most 
favourable  sector for  enhancing  employment-intensity,  (land)  assets  of  the  poor,  (staples) 
consumption of the poor, demand absorption of the extra output, and consistency of progress 
among main poverty groups.  
 
And just as the case for agriculture as the source of poverty-reducing growth, if successful, 
self-destructs, so does the case for small farms. In countries or regions that have succeeded in 
slashing mass dollar poverty, the above arguments for concentrating farm growth on small 
farms are weakened. On equity grounds, major initial success against mass dollar poverty 
induces urbanisation; shifts in rural and urban economic structure towards non-farm work and 
urban life; and demographic declines in workforce growth (eventually: pp. ), even for the 
remaining dollar-poor: all three trends, by cutting the dependency of labour on agriculture, 
shift the emphasis of anti-poverty policy away elsewhere, and hence away from farm size. On 
efficiency  grounds  (sec.  III),  initial  success  brings  rising  capital/labour  ratios,  so  that 
transaction-cost  reductions  become  more  important  for  costs  associated  with  capital 
acquisition  and  use,  as  opposed  to  those  associated  with  labour  search,  screening  and 
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supervision- i.e. for costs readily reduced by large units, rather than small ones. Both sorts of 
change shift the emphasis from smaller to larger scales of farming. 
 
However,  countries  and  regions  where  initial  development  has  been  attempted  with  land 
heavily concentrated into large farms - those with very unequal farmland, as in much of 
Southern and some of Eastern Africa, and much of Latin America - move from low-income to 
middle-income status, if at all, with severe, and still largely rural, unemployment, and dollar-
poverty levels far ahead of what is normal for their levels of PPP-GDP per person. There has 
not  been  ‘success’, even  in  initial  mass-poverty-reducing  growth,  and  hence  the  case  for 
small-farm-based development has not self-destructed. It remains to be seen whether this can 
be corrected without renewed emphasis on small-farm development and asset acquisition. 
 
The  countries, chiefly Asian,  that  have  achieved  initial  success  in  sharply  reducing  mass 
poverty  through  farm  growth  –  while  they  have  largely  maintained,  or  even  accelerated, 
growth as it shifted to the non-farm sector – have been much less successful in maintaining 
the rate of poverty reduction. The responsiveness of poverty reduction to economic growth in 
China and India, for example, has been much less since the mid-1990s than was the case in 
1970-85.  Further,  middle-income  counties  in  Southern  Africa and  Latin  America,  despite 
quite  low  shares  of  agriculture  in  workforce  and  GDP,  have  been  rather  unsuccessful  in 
bringing  down  mass  dollar  poverty,  which  is  far  above  levels  predicted  from  global 
regressions against PPP income-per-person; even after agriculture’s share of workforce has 
fallen below 20-25%,  inequality of farmland remains a strong predictor of overall inequality 
and absolute poverty – and presumably a fortiori, of weak transmission of growth into poverty 
reduction.
27  
 
So  processes  of  mass  poverty  reduction  through  agriculture  favour  small  farms  (as  more 
labour-intensive, as providing asset income to the poor, and as supplying locally available 
food staples), but do not mandate them. We defer to sec. III the issue of whether offsetting 
processes of liberalisation/globalisation processes undermine the small-farm case made by 
poverty-reduction processes. 
 
                                                 
27 A. de Janvry and E. Sadoulet, ‘Growth, poverty and inequality in Latin America: a causal analysis’, Review of Income and Wealth, 46 
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While initial success in economic growth and/or poverty reduction clearly reduces the role of 
farms, small or large, in carrying success further, experience in the successful developing 
countries  suggests  big  knowledge  gaps  about  how  to  continue,  or  revive,  rapid  poverty 
reduction that is not based on small-farm growth. More important, initial success in reducing 
mass poverty has not been achieved in large parts of the developing world; and the historical 
evidence is that it cannot be achieved without prior agricultural development, save in special 
cases  such  as  city-states  or  (unusually  well  handled)  mineral  discoveries.  But  can  that 
agricultural development be attained where it has not been attained so far? And can or should 
it be on small farms? 
 
IV. Can, Should, Will Small Farms Survive, Grow, Cut Poverty?  
All the above arguments would not ensure small farms’ survival, let alone their growth or contribution to 
poverty reduction, if they were competitively inefficient. The first issue is whether small farms have 
survived – have shrunk or increased their share of farmland – in developing countries. We measure 
smallness by land area, rather than gross or net output or labour-input. The policy issue is what farm 
sizes to encourage (or stop discouraging) by public action, including price policy, incentive-compatible 
land reform and/or tenancy policy.  
 
Note that large households tend to operate more land, and size inequality is usually much less per person 
than per household. In a study in the Indian Punjab, the per-person farmland Gini was half the per-
household  Gini.
28  It  also  matters  whether  land/water  quality  is  factored  in.  In  India  (but  often  not 
elsewhere;  certainly  not  in  Southern  Africa),  smaller  farms  tend  to  have  better-quality  land/  water 
endowments, so the Gini is much smaller if farmland is quality-adjusted.
29 However, “discussions of 
empirical facts are driven by the available comparative data. In the FAO farm censuses, land area of 
holdings is available for most countries, but no other potential measure of scale is widely available”.
30 
  
Thus holdings with low area are “small farms”, given our concerns and the data limitations. In 
deciding whether small farms are competitive or efficient (not quite the same thing) in a 
country, the first task is to see whether the proportion of farmland, found in small farms, is 
                                                 
28A. Julka and P. Sharma, ‘Measurement of land inequality in India: a revision of the Lorenz-Gini ratio’,  Indian J. Agricultural Economics, 
44, 4, 1989.  
29S.Bhalla and P.Roy, ‘Mis-specification in farm productivity analysis: the role of land quality’, Oxford Economic Papers 40, 1988: 55-73.   
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rising (falling). If so, it suggests either, dynamically, that small farms are becoming relatively 
more (less) efficient or competitive, or that farmers are steadily finding ways to approach a 
static farm-size optimum by evading or avoiding avoid laws or incentives impeding a move to 
optimal  farm  size.  Suggestion  is  not  proof;  perhaps  small  farms’  proportion  of  area  fell 
because, for  example,  new laws,  taxes or  price-manipulations, artificially favouring  small 
farms against large ones, were introduced and enforced, or old ones enforced, even though not 
incentive-compatible. However, such enforcement is usually very difficult in the long term. It 
seems likely that in a country or sub-region with substantial or steady falls in farm size – i.e. 
rises in the proportion of land operated in small farms – small farms were either statically 
more efficient (so land was being shifted into them by market forces such as sale and tenancy 
and/or  by  land  reforms  which  ‘stuck’  ex  post  in  the  marketplace),  or  were  dynamically 
becoming relatively more efficient.  
 
Alternative explanations, commonly advanced for falling mean farm size, are unconvincing.  
Rural  population  growth,  with  non-partible  inheritance,  increases  the  number  of  owned 
farmholdings. However, if larger farm size is efficient (or becoming more so), one would 
expect many new owners, inheriting  increasingly subdivided and tiny holdings, to sell, rent, 
or otherwise transfer and amalgamate them, so that land was increasingly operated in large 
holdings.  
Technical progress in agriculture decreases the operated area from which a given household 
can achieve a given total household income (or a given proportion of it), but that does not 
explain  why  land  owners  and  operators  might  increasingly  choose  smallness,  unless  it is 
efficient, or becoming more so. Of course land and other factor markets work imperfectly, 
and land laws constraining tenancy, sales, or farm size may be (partly) enforced. However, it 
is implausible -outside a Stalinist system - that low or falling levels of small-farm efficiency, 
relative to large farms, are consistent with long-term high and rising proportions of farmland 
in smallholdings.  
 
Tables 1 and 2 (see pages 83 – 85) show such high and rising proportions in a very large 
majority of developing countries. Table 1, based on data so far released from FAO’s 1990 and 
2000 World Censuses of Agriculture, covers all countries with such data, with over 100,000 
ha  of  farmland,  and  with  more  than  one  set  of  estimates  of  distribution  of  holdings  and 
farmland  by  farm  size  groups  between  1985  and  2003.  In  this  period,  accelerated   e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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globalisation  and  commercialisation  were  allegedly  shifting  competitive  advantage,  even 
capacity to survive, from small to large farms. Yet in Table 1 (A) - for only eight developing 
countries,  but  including  some  with  extensive  agricultural  area  (Ethiopia,  India,  Pakistan, 
Thailand) - seven countries show a rise in the proportion of farmland in the lowest two size-
categories of operation.
31 The changes in the proportions of area (and holdings) in different 
farm-size groups in these eight developing countries since 1985 are prima facie evidence 
against the view that globalisation, or anything else, made small farms less competitive or 
survivable.  Note  that  the  limited  data  for  (five)  developed  countries  show,  if  anything, 
declines in the proportion of farmland in the smaller size-groups. 
 
Table 2 allows a longer view, for more developing countries, over Agricultural Censuses from 
the 1970, 1980 and 1990 rounds (in practice, from 1969 to 1993). These data are not yet 
available for the 2000 round of agricultural censuses, so they may exclude the impact on farm 
size pf most post-1990, accelerated farm commercialisation and globalisation; but Table 1 
showed that this was at least consistent with falling farm size. Care is needed in interpreting 
the data – wars and other sources of non-comparability abound – but the message from two 
columns of Table 2 is unmistakeable. “Median size for number” is the size of the median 
holding, with all farms ranked in order of area. If instead we rank all farmed hectares, starting 
with each of the hectares in the largest holding and ending with those in the smallest, “median 
size for area” is the size of the holding in which the “median hectare” is located. The vast 
majority of successive Agricultural Censuses in both Asia and Africa between 1960 and 1990 
show steep or very steep falls in both median farm size for number and median farm size for 
                                                 
31The exception is Ethiopia, where the proportion of (private) land in holdings below 1 ha fell from 1989-82 to 2001-02. Continuing 
redistribution of collective and State lands after the 1989-92 Agricultural Census (in conjunction with population growth) raised private 
farm area 2.3-fold, but the number of holdings only 1.8-fold, so that many holdings in the smallest size category could be enlarged. Even in 
Ethiopia, the proportion of land in holdings below 5ha fell between successive agricultural censuses; the falling proportion of land in 
holdings below 1 ha was more than offset by the rising proportion of land in 1-5 ha holdings. 
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area. Thus a large and growing proportion of farmland is being cultivated in small holdings; 
and a large and growing proportion of farm operators is small.
32 Why is this happening?  
 
First, there is no production-related reason why it should not. There is neither theory, nor a 
weight of evidence from developing countries, that suggests any of the following: economies 
of scale (output rising more than 1% when all producer inputs rise 1%); unit production costs 
falling as farm scale increases; or falling unit production costs as farm size (area) rises. A few 
studies in developing countries find significantly non-constant returns or costs, but in most 
such cases either returns increase (or costs decrease) uniformly as farm size falls, or there are 
increasing returns to farm size only up to a very small threshold level of holding size (say 0.5 
or 1 ha) and mildly decreasing returns thereafter. Perhaps most important, a large balance of 
evidence, though not all, favours the existence of an “inverse relationship” between farm size 
and yield-per-hectare in developing-country agricultures.
33 Though this predicts, and in some 
sense “justifies”, the observed shift towards smaller farm size - especially where much land is 
concentrated in large farms - it tells us nothing about efficiency or economies/diseconomies 
of scale, any more than does the similarly large balance of evidence of a direct relationship 
between farm size and yield-per-labour-hour. For reasons discussed in the next paragraph, 
small farms are choosing to farm given areas with more labour and less capital than otherwise 
similar large farms. Given that both large and small farms select from the techniques and 
crop-mixes likely to be efficient in developing rural areas, this means higher average yields 
(and probably average productivity of capital) for smaller farms, and higher average labour-
productivity for large ones.  
 
Second, however, there is a credible account of transaction costs that explains the evidence in 
the  above  tables,  and  predicts  small  farms  in  developing  countries  (and  large  farms  in 
developed countries) (see Eastwood et al., circulated). Unit transaction costs associated with 
labour  search,  supervision  and  screening  normally  decrease  as  farm  size  falls,  because 
household/family  members  are  a  larger  part  of  the  workforce,  because  there  are  more 
                                                 
32 This is in sharp contrast to the trends in developed countries shown in Table 2. There, the size of farm containing the ‘median hectare‘ is 
not only larger than in developing Asia or Africa, but (in contrast to these) is falling in most cases, often sharply.  
33 H. Binswanger, K. Deininger & G. Feder in Handbook of Development Economics, vol. IIIB (ed. J. Behrman & T. N. Srinivasan), North 
Holland, 1996; IFAD (2001), ch. 5; A. Berry and W. Cline, Agrarian Structure and Productivity in Developing Countries, Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins, 1979; Booth and Sundrum, op. cit., 1985; Eastwood, Lipton and Newell, forthcoming Lipton, World Development, 1993.    e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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household/family members to supervise each unit of hired labour input,
34 and because the 
farm operator has a smaller space over which to supervise. On the other hand, unit transaction 
costs associated with capital acquisition and use decrease as farm size rises: a loan of $1000 
costs less to negotiate than ten loans of $100, and a tractor is somewhat cheaper to manage 
and schedule on a large holding than on many small ones. Therefore, where incentives lead 
farmers to choose high labour/capital ratios – in developing areas with initial mass poverty 
and, increasingly, land and/or water constraints in developed countries - smallness has net 
advantages because it cuts transaction costs associated with labour. Where farmers choose 
low labour/capital ratios – in developed countries where labour, especially rural labour, is 
more costly relative to capital, so that cutting unit transactions costs associated with capital 
matters more than cutting those associated with labour - largeness has net advantages because 
it cuts transaction costs associated with capital. This is consistent with the data in tables 1 and 
2,  and  helps  account  for  the  tendency  of  farm  size  to  be  higher  in  developed  than  in 
developing countries. One needs, to factor in the effects of (a) ‘colonial land grab’ in creating 
and perpetuating above-optimal farm size in Latin America, Southern (and parts of Eastern) 
Africa, and plantation regions of the Caribbean and small parts of rural Asia, and of enforces 
State  and  collective  farming  in  (more  briefly)  over-enlarging  farms  in  communist 
agricultures; (b) land reform, partly to correct this, reducing median farm size in big areas of 
Latin America and Asia (and in transitional economies) – an effect far larger than suggested 
by popular accounts of the evasion and general unsuccess of such reforms. 
 
A further transaction-cost effect, favouring small farms in early development and large farms 
later, concerns the transaction cost of disposing of output. There are economies of scale, off-
farm, in  processing  and  transporting  cash  crops.  These  need  not  be  translated  into much 
higher distribution costs for small farms (see below), but there are costs of transactions and/or 
intermediation if it is to be avoided. On the other hand, if self-consumption is a large part of 
total farm output, small farms have several transactions-cost and associated advantages over 
large ones. In farming, a household with a small farm escapes – as a large commercial farm 
operator  does  not  –  costs  of  purchasing  much  of  its  own  farm  needs,  and  also  costs  of 
marketing its product, in both cases especially if that product is a staple, where transport costs 
for marketed products  are typically large relative to farm value-added. Large farms also incur 
                                                 
34 M. Taslim, 1989. ‘Supervision problems and the size-productivity relation in Bangladesh agriculture' . Oxford Bull. Economics and 
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price risk, as self-consumers do not, or to a much smaller extent. More subtly, as hypothesised 
by Srinivasan and later established empirically by Barrett, staples deficit farms reduce price 
risk by expanding production (because expansion cuts the effect on them of consumer price 
rises), while staples surplus farms increase that risk (because expansion  raises the impact on 
them of producer price falls). These effects renders unit transactions costs likely to rise with 
farm size in rural areas where self-consumption is a big part of output, and to fall with farm 
size where marketings are overwhelmingly predominant in output – just as differential factor-
specific transaction costs render total unit transaction costs likely to rise with farm size in 
rural areas where conditions favour techniques and crop-mixes with high labour/capital ratios, 
and to fall with farm size where low ratios are favoured. 
 
But do liberalisation/globalisation processes undermine  the pressures  to  small farms from 
transactions-cost theory and poverty-reduction processes? The data of Tables 1 and 2 suggest, 
but do not prove, that this undermining has, at least so far, not been predominant. However, it 
is not absent. The new institutions of farm-product exchange - supermarkets, national and 
foreign; grades and standards, often private ones, affecting process (e.g. pesticide application, 
child labour) as well as product; large horticultural export buyers – tend to favour overview, 
bulking-up and processing at a fairly large scale. Such institutions have spread since the mid-
1980s in the developing world, far faster than historical precedent from the developed world 
would have led us to expect - first in Latin America and SE Asia, but later in China, Southern 
Africa, and recently some other parts of Africa and of South Asia. Some of these places 
include areas of mass dollar poverty.  Do these new institutions of globalisation seriously 
impede  a  small-farm  path  to  poverty-reducing  agricultural  development?  Many  papers 
identify possible paths, and point to success stories, though stressing the difficulties. The great 
successes in (for example) micro-scale sweet limes and pomegranates, following the spread of 
micro-drip irrigation in Western India, is only the most recent of many illustrations that, with 
appropriate initial information and support, extremely small farmers can hook onto, and meet 
standards for, complex and distant markets. The problems of intermediation between small 
farms and supermarkets, export horticulture, etc. are perhaps not so different from past, and 
often solved, problems of intermediation between small growers of tea, sugar, rubber and 
cotton and large processors, marketers and final users.
35  
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These  intermediation  problems  do,  however,  threaten  the  advantage  of  smallness  in 
agricultures with high labour/capital ratios, viz. that it cuts the (transaction) cost of labour 
search, screening and supervision (see sec. III). That advantage can be outweighed by new 
requirements (e.g. grades and standards) for selling to wider markets, in commercialised or 
globalised agriculture. Such requirements create, for the (wholesale/supermarket) buyer, an 
extra unit cost of ensuring, say, non-excessive pesticide application, or for absence of child 
labour (e.g. to meet supermarket standards). The extra cost to the buyer of achieving a given 
degree of confidence that, say, pesticide use on 100,000 kg of a vegetable is not above a 
certain level is normally less if the purchase is from one big farm rather than 100, let alone 
10,000,  small  ones.  That  excess  may  be  more  than  the  cost  reduction  from  small-farm 
procurement due to the large farm’s extra unit cost of labour supervision in direct production 
processes (ploughing, weeding, water management, harvesting and so on). Higher standards-
ensuring transaction costs to a buyer can outweigh the lower unit costs of the small/family 
units in supervising direct production.  
 
There are two  ways  to tackle  this in  modern  enlarging,  liberalising  and  globalising  farm 
markets - and both call up analogies to earlier concerns that small farmers would be unable to 
compete in crops such as tea, rubber and sugar, requiring standardisation of product quality 
and timing by farmers, for synchronised and rapid crop collection and processing by or for 
wholesalers. First, intermediation: as has happened with tea, cotton, rubber and sugar over 
huge areas, intermediaries can find it profitable to check that grades and standards are attained 
by  smallholders’  products  (with  otherwise  lower  direct  unit  costs),  and  then  to  bulk  up 
approved  products  for  sale  to  the  large  buyer.  Second,  internalisation:  as  happened  with 
micro-irrigated  horticulture  in  Western  India,  smallholders  may  be  able  to  acquire  and 
internalise, on terms competitive with large farmers, the information, incentives and methods 
to supervise the new requirements of buyers for larger markets, so that buyers can check them 
                                                                                                                                                          
Agribusiness Strategic Responses in Developing Countries' , International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, 2(3), 2001; T. 
Reardon, S. Rozelle, P. Timmer & Honglin Wang, ‘Emergence of supermarkets with Chinese characteristics’, Development Policy Review, 
2004; T. Reardon, P. Timmer, C. Barrett & J. Berdegue, ‘The rise of supermarkets in Africa, Asia and Latin America’, American J. 
Agricultural Economics, 85, 2003; Binswanger, Deininger and Feder 1996, loc. cit.; IFAD 2001, loc. cit., ch. 5; Creating New Markets for 
the Poor with Micro-irrigation Technologies in Maharashtra, India: Final report to USAID, International Development Enterprises (India), 
New Delhi, 2004. 
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with a lighter (and cheaper) hand. With internalisation, new markets with their associated 
standards can in principle favour smallness: pesticide and size control could have lower unit 
costs if done by motivated family farmers or closely supervised hired workers on small farms, 
rather  than  by  employees  and/or  machinery  or  chemical  tests  applied by  buyers  or  large 
farmers. With intermediation, new markets need not disfavour small farms; intermediation 
costs can be less than small-scale supervision savings.  
 
While there are many instances of successful internalisation and/or intermediation - allowing 
smallholders to remain competitive in wider markets as supermarkets, grades and standards, 
and wholesaling to export horticulture spread - in East and South Asia (especially China and 
India), this appears to be much rarer, especially for fruit and vegetable markets, in Latin 
America  and  sub-Saharan Africa  (Reardon et  al). In some  Latin American cases such as 
Chile, this may be because development has already raised capital/labour ratios enough to 
undermine  the  advantages  of  small  farms.  This  is  unlikely  to  be  the  explanation  in  sub-
Saharan African countries, which are mostly starved of capital and with abundant labour at 
very low productivity or even unemployed. This may also be, or may become, relevant for 
smallholder involvement in poverty heartlands in South and Inner Asia, if there is a real 
prospect to enter into wider markets for cash crops.   
 
The death of small farms has often been predicted. The evidence from the only source of 
large-scale, comparative data, the FAO World Census of Agriculture, is that, if anything, 
small farms are occupying increasing shares of farmland in developing countries, even during 
the period of (and in the areas exposed to) intense liberalisation and globalisation. Yet some 
of the institutions that grow alongside liberalisation and globalisation, unless accompanied by 
internalisation or intermediation, do reduce and can reverse the competitive advantages of 
small farms. The policy issue is what governments in developed and developing countries can 
and should do about this. For developed countries, accelerated reduction of farm tariff and 
subsidy, and other support is the obvious answer. It is less obvious that this will not favour 
large (as against small) farmers in developing countries. I know of no theory or evidence that 
explores this. However, theory generally concludes that liberalisation and globalisation, by 
raising demand for products incorporating a country’s relatively plentiful factor, shifts income 
to labour – and to small farmers with higher labour/capital ratios – in developing countries. 
For  this  reason  (and  because  of  the  effect  on  those  with  high  ratios  of  food  to  total   e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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consumption, normally the poor) I am doubtful about the suggestion, on its surface attractive, 
that developing countries should protect their agricultures against even subsidised competition 
from OECD.  A better option is to provide far more rural and agricultural goods that are 
undersupplied by the market. This extends well beyond pure public goods. It includes (at least 
initially)  support  for  the  institutions  to  intermediate  between  smallholders  and  the  larger 
national  and  global  economy,  and  to  internalise  with  smallholders  the  information  and 
training required. It also includes agricultural research, roads, and irrigation in many cases. 
That  seems  a  preferable  option  for  developing-country  governments  faced  with  OECD 
countries that preach (and impose) liberalisation and globalisation, but practise the opposite. 
In such a context, however, even though small farmers have shown they can survive and 
grow, such a second best, for the world’s poor, is very second indeed.  
 
We also may need to ask: what are (region-specific) conditions where, to cut mass poverty via 
small farms, ‘best strategy’ is extra production for (a) ‘subsistence’/extended subsistence, (b) 
local or nearby markets, (c) urban domestic markets, (d) exports; and extra production of (A) 
main staples, (B) fruit and vegetables, (C) beverage and fibre crops, (D) animal products? In 
practice, policymakers (and the set of small farmers, and like many individual small-farm 
households) mix strategies, and answers to the ‘for’ and ‘of’ questions interact, but – except 
that  (a)  induces  (A)  –  most  combinations  are  feasible.  The  outcomes,  and  the  correct 
emphases,  depend partly on  evolving  global and national  market incentives  and  transport 
costs,  but  also  on  public  policy,  including  both  macro-policy  and  policies  on  irrigation, 
research, transport, and regional allocation of infrastructure and current public spending.   e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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Table 1. Small and medium farms: Agricultural censuses from 1985 
(Countries with > 100,000 ha farmland & censuses in 1990 and 2000 rounds with % area and holdings by size groups: FAO website)) 
                                         Table 1, Part A: Africa, Asia, and Central and South America 
Country  Year  Holdings (m)  Ha (m)  < 1 Ha  1–2 Ha  2–5 Ha  5–10 Ha  10–20 Ha 
        %hdgs  %ha  %hdgs  %ha  %hdgs  %ha  %hdgs  %ha  %hdgs  %ha 
Colombia  88      1.45    36.03  14.1   0.3  21.5*  1.4*  13.0*   1.9*  16.0    4.4  12.6   7.0 
  01      2.02    50.71  18.1   0.4  23.0*  1.7*  11.7*   1.8*  14.4    4.0  11.1   6.2 
Egypt  90      2.91             3.30  60.6’  18.5’  29.3’  30.4’    6.8,  15.9,    2.1,  10.1,    0.9|   9.8| 
  99/00      3.72     3.75  81.1’  33.5’  13.9’  24.0’    3.3,  13.2,    1.2,    9.9,    0.5|   8.8| 
Ethiopia  89/92      6.09     4.87  72.1  36.9  20.2  25.2    7.4  25.4    0.3    2.2     ..     .. 
  01/02    10.76    11.05  62.8  27.1  24.3  33.3  11.9  32.6    0.9    5.5     ..     .. 
India  86    97.16  164.56  57.8  13.4  18.4  15.6  13.6”  22.3”    8.1”  28.6”     ..     .. 
  91  106.64  165.51  59.4  15.0  18.8  17.4  16.8  30.9    4.4  19.3     ..     .. 
  95/96  115.58  163.36  61.6  17.2  18.7  18.8  14.8  31.5    3.7  17.7    1.0   9.2 
Nepal  92      2.74      2.60  69.8  30.5  19.4   27.6    9.4  28.0    1.2    8.1     ..     .. 
  02      3.34      2.65  74.7  38.9  17.6  29.8    6.9  24.0    0.6    5.3      ..     .. 
Pakistan  90      5.07    19.15  27.0    3.7  20.4   7.6  37.5  27.6  12.3   21.6    4.7  15.8 
  00      6.62    20.41  36.1    5.8  21.5   9.7  28.1  27.9    8.8   19.1    3.9  16.3 
Panama  90      0.21      2.94  46.7    0.5  11.4   0.9  13.5    2.7    7.6     3.5    7.1    6.7 
  01      0.24      2.77  52.7    0.6    ..    ..    ..    ..    ..    ..     ..     .. 
Thailand  88      4.88    17.46  14.4    2.5  12.3^  4.2^  59.7^  54.6^    ..    ..     ..     ..   e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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  93      5.65    19.00  19.7     3.0  13.2<  4.6<  45.0<  36.1<  17.2<  32.0<     ..        .. 
Turkey  91      3.97    23.45  15.9    1.4   19.0  4.3  32.1  16.5   18.0  19.0    9.7  21.0 
  01      3.02    18.43  15.5    1.3  17.9  4.0  31.5  16.0   18.5  20.7  10.8  23.5 
Uruguay>  90      0.05    15.80     >      >    8.1        --------------        0.1  12.1    0.3  13.2    0.6 
  00      0.06     16.42       >      >  10.9        --------------        0.1         12.5  0.3  12.5    0.6 
Notes: Holdings without farmland (Colombia 1988; Egypt, Nepal 2002; Panama 2001), area in them (Egypt), and government 
holdings (Pakistan) omitted. “m” = million. 
*: 1–3 ha and 3–5 ha, not 1–2 ha and 2–5 ha    ’: < 0.8 ha and 0.8–2.1 ha    ,: 2.1–4.2 ha and 4.2–8.4 ha    |: 8.4–21 ha.  ”: 2–4 ha and 
4–10 ha    ^: 1–1.6 ha and 1.6–6.4 ha    <: 1–1.6 ha, 1.6–4.8 ha and 4.8–9.6 ha    >: excludes holdings below 1 ha   
 
Table 2. Size (hectares) of (a) median farm and (b) farm with median hectare: Developing-country trends
1 
Country  Date  Med. Farm  Med. Ha      Country  Date  Med. Farm  Med. Ha 
Africa            (Dvpg. Asia)       
Congo DR  1970  1.2  1.8      Turkey  1980  3.6  13.0 
  1990  0.39  0.76        1991  3.0  13.0 
Ethiopia  1977  1.0  2.3             
  1989/92  0.54  1.3      S/Cent. America       
Lesotho  1970  1.5  2.6      Brazil
3  1970  0.4  520 
  1990  1.1  2.4        1980  9.8  730 
Malawi  1969  1.2  2.1        1985  8.6  670 
  1993  0.52  1.8      Panama  1971  3.6  86 
              1981  1.7  95 
Dvpg. Asia              1991  1.2  110   e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
 
 
 
- 85 - 
India  1971  0.98  5.5      Paraguay  1981  8.2  --- 
  1977  0.85  4.8        1991  6.9  --- 
  1991  0.74  3.4      Peru  1972  1.8  --- 
Indonesia  1973  0.56  1.8        1994  2.5  --- 
  1993  0.54  1.8             
Korea, Rep.  1970  0.71  1.2             
  1980  0.75  .81             
  1990  0.81  1.4             
Nepal  1972  ---  2.4             
  1982  0.49  2.8             
  1992  --  1.6             
Pakistan
2  1980  2.9  7.8             
  1989  2.1  7.2             
Thailand  1978  2.7  5.8             
  1993  2.4  5.5             
 Source: FAO agricultural censuses, rounds for the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, at www.fao.org/es/ess/census/gini/table2.asp.  
Notes: Countries with less than 25,000 hectares of farmland are omitted. The column headed “Med. Farm” shows the 
“median size for number,” that is, hectare size of the median farm ranked by size. “Med. Ha” shows the “median size for 
area,” that is, hectare size of the farm containing the “median hectare” of farmland, with hectares ranked in order of the size 
of the farm where they are found.  
Notes (from original FAO source):  
1 Includes holdings without land [usually zero or very few]. Includes only countries with data for the 1990 census round and 
for the 1980 and/or 1970 census rounds. 
2 Data exclude 149 Government holdings with 103 035 ha for 1989, and 192 Government holdings with 49 995 ha for 1980. 
3 Due to lack of data for 1986–95, data from the 1985 Agricultural Census are presented   e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                    Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 58-85, 2006 
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